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SCUFFED CHUCKS: CONVERSE’S SCUFFLE, THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S OVERSTEP, AND THE 
COURT’S STANCE ON TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT 
Angela P. Tam* 
The multi-billion-dollar footwear industry accounts for an enormous 
portion of the United States economy.  Among the top brands, an iconic pair 
of shoes is the Converse All-Star Chuck Taylor.  The rubber shoe company 
generated a global revenue of nearly $2 billion in 2019 alone.  The consistent 
popularity of the Chuck Taylors over the last decades has prompted many 
copycats to try to mimic the company’s leading look. 
The Federal Circuit recently ruled in a trademark infringement case, 
Converse Inc. v. International Trade Commission.  The case followed Con-
verse’s complaint against various footwear products, including brands such 
as Sketchers and New Balance, for the importation and sale of shoes that 
infringe on its trademark––its classic All-Star shoes design.  The Federal 
Circuit rejected the International Trade Commission’s balancing test for 
finding secondary meaning and reversed the International Trade Commis-
sion’s holding.  In doing so, the Federal Circuit gave its own set of factors 
for the balancing test for the first time, amidst the numerous tests developed 
by circuit courts over the years. 
Although there should be uniformity across the circuit courts in finding 
secondary meaning, the Federal Circuit’s test should not be followed.  The 
Federal Circuit’s ruling comes with implications that can affect the apparel 
industry and possible resolutions for future controversy.  Instead, this Com-
ment proposes a new multi-factor test after exploring the differences between 
the Federal Circuit’s test and the various circuit courts’ tests. 
 
* J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2020.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Shannon Treviño and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review’s staff and 
editors for their time and assistance in publishing this Comment.  Specifically, the author would 
like to thank Satenik Kirakosyan and Hasmik Hmayakyan for their encouragement throughout the 
writing process, and Christopher Netniss and Nima Zargari for their dedication and feedback during 
the production cycle.  Additionally, the author would like to give a special thank you to her parents, 
Schuman and May Tam, for their constant love and support. 
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In the end, [Chuck] Taylor’s talent for basketball may be less 
memorable than his talent for sales. After all, the marketing tech-
niques used by today’s athletic-apparel companies . . . were pio-
neered by Converse, and by Chuck Taylor himself. That may ex-
plain why “Chucks” remain a hot-selling shoe . . . “Like Levi’s 
and Ford Mustangs, Chucks are iconic–they’ll always be cool.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Searching for that classic streetwear look?  Converse’s All-Star Chuck 
Taylor shoes have provided that look for multiple generations of consumers.  
From the 1980’s shoppers looking to channel their inner Ally Sheedy in “The 
Breakfast Club” or Michael J. Fox in “Back to the Future,” to millennial and 
gen-z shoppers influenced by “Forever Chuck” campaigns that are endorsed 
by “Stranger Things” actress Millie Bobbie Brown.2  This pair of shoes has 
promulgated its way through mainstream media enough to have a website 
dedicated to tracking its appearances on the big screen.3  Converse even ca-
ters to shoppers looking for a “newer” version of the classic Chuck Taylors 
 
1. Scott Freeman, The Shoes Make the Man, INDIANAPOLIS MONTHLY, Apr. 2006, at 1, 32 
(quoting ABRAHAM AAMIDOR, CHUCK TAYLOR, ALL STAR: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MAN 
BEHIND THE MOST FAMOUS ATHLETIC SHOE IN HISTORY (2017)). 
2. See Ann-Christine Diaz, Converse’s Dramatic ‘Forever Chuck’ Finale Passes Baton to 
New Army of Cultural Heroes, ADAGE (Mar. 9, 2017), https://adage.com/creativity/work/forever-
chuck-finale/51221 [https://perma.cc/M33U-8XQH]; Stranger Things’ Millie Bobby Brown Ex-
plores the History of Chuck Taylors in Film, COMPLEX (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.complex.com
/sneakers/2017/02/stranger-things-eleven-millie-bobby-brown-chucks-in-film-converse-chuck-
taylor [https://perma.cc/V755-SXEX]. 
3. The Chuck Taylor in Films, THE CHUCKSCONNECTION, https://www.chucksconnec-
tion.com/films.html#S [https://perma.cc/7UJQ-YB44]. 
TAM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/20  1:19 PM 
2020] SCUFFED CHUCKS 205 
by releasing revamped models, including the Converse Renew series,4 the 
Converse Chuck Taylor 100 Logo Embroidery,5 and the All-Star Pro BB.6 
Today, shoppers looking for that classic streetwear look will discover 
that Chuck Taylors are not the only shoes that surface on the Internet or fill 
up shelf space in stores: shoppers can stumble upon Skechers’ Bobs Lo-To-
pia7 or Utopio-Jet Set.8  The look of these Skechers shoes are reminiscent of 
Converse and are cheaper to boost,9 which makes Skechers an appealing al-
ternative purchase to Converse.  As shoppers continue to search for footwear 
embodying the classic basketball shoes, familiar silhouettes made by other 
companies can turn up.10  Next thing Converse knows, it has to fight to pro-
tect its iconic look from designs that can claim to be “inspired” by the Chuck 
Taylors. 
This scenario is a familiar issue the apparel industry constantly faces.  
Trademark11 protection and the strategy for finding infringement has played 
an important role in the apparel business, as well as many other businesses.  
Apparel industry brands try to keep themselves recognizable while balancing 
 
4. Nick Compton, Converse’s new Trainers are made from 11 Plastic Bottles per pair, 
WIRED (June 26, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/recycled-converse-renew-chuck-taylor-
all-star [https://perma.cc/8MHJ-EXUE]. 
5. Ross Dwyer, Converse Adds Giant Script Logos Onto The Chuck Taylor, SNEAKER 
NEWS (September 1, 2019), https://sneakernews.com/2019/09/01/converse-chuck-taylor-script-
logo-release-info/ [https://perma.cc/A9TN-6KY7]. 
6. Cam Wolf, How Converse Used its History to Create the Basketball Shoe of the Future, 
GQ (April 17, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/converse-all-star-pro-bb [https://perma.cc/77ND-
G6FE]. 
7. Skechers Bobs Lo-Topia, SKECHERS, https://www.skechers.com/en-us/style/33916
/skechers-bobs-lo-topia/nvy [https://perma.cc/R59H-UNTH]. 
8. Skechers Utopia, SKECHERS, https://www.skechers.com/en-us/style/767/utopia-jet-set
/wht# [https://perma.cc/EG9Z-7RWE]. 
9. Compare Skechers Bobs Lo-Topia, supra note 7, with Chuck Taylor All Star, CONVERSE, 
https://www.converse.com/shop/chuck-taylor-all-star-shoes [https://perma.cc/7SNM-J35A]. 
10. Gavin Yeung, 10 Sneakers Inspired by the Converse Chuck Taylor All-Stars, 
HYPEBEAST (August 5, 2015), https://hypebeast.com/2015/8/10-sneakers-inspired-by-the-con-
verse-chuck-taylor-all-stars [https://perma.cc/CPD8-3K37]. 
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2019) (defining a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.”). 
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to keep up with trends.  These brands do so to remain relevant and marketa-
ble.  This can especially be true with apparel involving footwear, where 
styles can overlap.  Trademarks for shoes “represent the goodwill and repu-
tation of the shoe as a product and its source,” the brand.12  For example, 
Nike owns a registered trademark of the “Nike swoosh,”13 and Christian 
Louboutin has trade dress14 rights on its specific red-colored soles, both of 
which prevent others from using those trademarks.15  Trademark rights allow 
business owners and designers to have time to market new designs, increase 
popularity, and sell products as proprietors.16  At the same time, trademark 
rights help keep competition apart.17  Additionally, with long-term exclusiv-
ity in that trademark, trademark rights allow for iconic designs to survive the 
short-term trends.18  
This Comment addresses the Federal Circuit’s recent ruling in Con-
verse, Inc. v. International Trade Commission (“Converse”) regarding trade-
mark infringement of Converse’s Chuck Taylors shoes.19  First, this Com-
ment identifies concerns with the Court’s assessment of the factors weighed 
to determine the existence of secondary meaning.20  Second, this Comment 
 
12. Jonathan Hyman et al., If the IP Fits, Wear It: IP Protection for Footwear - A U.S. 
Perspective, 108 TRADEMARK REP. 645, 658 (2018). 
13. SWOOSH DESIGN, Registration No. 1,323,343. 
14. A trade dress is a subcategory of a trademark.  It refers to packaging designs or the 
design of a good that has gained secondary meaning in the marketplace, identifying the design to a 
particular source and not merely an ornamental aspect of the good.  See Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara 
Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209–14 (2000); Abercrombie & Fitch Stores v. American Eagle Out-
fitters, 280 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2002). 
15. Hyman et al., supra note 12, at 648, 659. 
16. Id. at 649. 
17. Id. at 649, 658. 
18. Id. 
19. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
20. A mark acquires secondary meaning when it is recognized by consumers in connection 
with the producer or manufacturer of the product.  Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 
231 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (noting that secondary meaning is generally “established 
through extensive advertising which creates in the minds of consumers an association between the 
mark and the provider of the [products or] services advertised under the mark.”); see also Test 
Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2015) 
TAM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/20  1:19 PM 
2020] SCUFFED CHUCKS 207 
discusses the problems associated with federal jurisdiction over trademark 
claims.  Currently, “the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over [cer-
tain] trademark issues,” but it defers to regional circuits on ancillary trade-
mark claims.21  Absent exclusive jurisdiction, deferring to regional circuits 
produces different standards, which leads to increasing inconsistencies be-
tween the circuits regarding trademark law claims.22 
This Comment argues for a set standard to find trademark infringement.  
The proposed standard would (1) strengthen consumer protection to balance 
out the increase in trademark-holder protection, and (2) encourage fair com-
petition, which would concurrently lend more certainty to businesses and 
their brands.  Additionally, in contrast to the Federal Circuit’s ruling, this 
Comment argues for courts to continue distinguishing between priority use 
under common law and the validity of a registered mark.23  Moreover, when 
determining priority of use, before courts require a mark user to show that 
an allegedly infringing mark has secondary meaning, courts should consider 
when the use of the mark began.  
Part II of this Comment discusses the current standards required to es-
tablish trademark infringement with an emphasis on how distinctiveness and 
priority of use come into play.  This Part also briefly explains theories of 
consumer-protection and trademark-holder-protection within trademark law.  
Part III looks at the Converse24 case and focuses on the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission’s (ITC) evaluation and the Federal Circuit’s rul-
ing, as well as the significance of the dissent.  Next, Part IV discusses the 
 
(citation omitted) (explaining that “[s]econdary meaning occurs when, in the minds of the public, 
the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product 
itself.”).  See infra Part II. Section A(1). 
21. These issues include: “(1) appeals from the Trademark Trials and Appeal Board 
(TTAB), (2) appeals from the ITC in cases that deal with imported goods that allegedly infringe a 
trademark, and (3) appeals with ancillary jurisdiction of a trademark claim that arises from a patent 
claim.”  Gilbert T. Smolenski and Matthew M. Welch, Comment: The Call for Consistency-the 
Case for the Federal Circuit to Have Exclusive Jurisdiction for Trademark Matters, 19 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 95, 101–02 (2018). 
22. Id. at 103. 
23. Generally, a first in time principle is used to determine which mark user has “priority 
of use.”  This principle looks to who first used the mark to determine who had priority use.  See 
Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 575, 579–80 (D. Mass. 1986).  See infra Part II, 
Section A(2). 
24. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
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varying multi-factored tests across the circuit courts, and the Federal Cir-
cuit’s divergence from the existing tests to find secondary meaning.  Part V 
confronts the implications of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Converse, 
what improvements could be made to determine secondary meaning, and the 
impact of how the Federal Circuit addressed priority of use of a common law 
trade dress.  Finally, Part VI discusses the potential impact on the footwear 
industry and possibly even the apparel industry. 
II. ESTABLISHING A TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CLAIM 
A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combina-
tion thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her 
goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the 
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.”25  For shoes, trade 
dress—a subcategory of trademarks—can refer to shoe packaging designs or 
shoe designs, including components or elements of a shoe’s design, that gain 
secondary meaning in the marketplace.26  Secondary meaning in the market-
place occurs when a shoe packaging design or shoe design identifies that 
design to a particular source, and is not merely ornamental.27  For example, 
and in addition to the previously mentioned Nike and Louboutin trade 
dresses, in PUMA SE v. Forever 21, Inc.,28 Puma accused Forever 21 of trade 
dress infringement based on Puma’s three Fenty-collaboration shoe de-
signs.29  The court in PUMA SE found that Puma’s trade dress was suffi-
ciently particular enough in identifying the source to Puma’s Fenty Shoes, 
and had thus gained secondary meaning in the marketplace.30 
 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2019). 
26. See infra Part II, Section A(1).  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 
U.S. 205, 211–14, (2000); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 
280 F.3d 619, 637 (6th Cir. 2002). 
27. See infra Part II, Section A(1).  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 211–14; Aber-
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.3d at 643–44. 
28. Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc., No. CV17-2523 PSG Ex, 2017 WL 4771004 (C.D. Cal. 
June 29, 2017). 
29. Puma, 2017 WL 4771004 at *1; Jessica Cohen-Nowak, Puma SE v. Forever 21, Inc.: 
Puma’s Fenty Slides May Not Have the Traction for the Uphill Battle against Forever 21, 107 
TRADEMARK REP. 1238, 1242–46 (2017) (describing the “Creeper Sneaker,” the “Fur Slide,” and 
the “Bow Slide”). 
30. Puma, 2017 WL 4771004 at *5.  The Puma court ultimately dismissed the trade dress 
cause of action because Puma failed to adequately plead the nonfunctional prong of finding trade 
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The Trademark Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham Act, 
provides trademark owners of a registered or unregistered mark a right of 
civil action for infringement.31  In other words, trademark protection can 
come through a federally registered mark or through common law.  It is not 
mandatory for a mark to get federal registration under the United States Pa-
tent & Trademark Office (USPTO).32  However, if a mark is federally regis-
tered, it is presumed to be valid, and the registrant is presumed to have the 
exclusive right to use the trademark throughout the United States.33  A reg-
istered mark also allows for: 1) notice to the public of that ownership because 
the registered mark is readily revealed in trademark clearance searches; 2) 
exclusive right to use that mark in connection with the goods and/or services 
listed in the registration; 3) blocks on confusingly similar marks from regis-
tering; and 4) registration with Customs and Border Patrol to help block the 
importation of counterfeit goods.34   
Owners who have an unregistered mark, on the other hand, have com-
mon law rights only in areas of commerce which are known by consumers.35  
An unregistered mark provides limited protection compared to a federally 
registered mark.  Consider the following illustration: a junior user in a remote 
region used the mark after the first use by a senior user, and adopted the mark 
 
dress infringement; however, Puma’s amended complaint does seem to adequately plead both 
prongs needed.  See Puma v. Forever 21, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-02523-PSG-E, 2017 WL 6817592 (C.D. 
Cal. July 12, 2017). 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2019). 
32. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK 10 (2019), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/74K9-4LJJ]. 
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2019) (“Any registration issued under the Act of March 3, 1881, 
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or of a mark registered on the principal register provided by this 
chapter and owned by a party to an action shall be admissible in evidence and shall be prima facie 
evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant’s 
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in com-
merce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration subject to any 
conditions or limitations stated therein, but shall not preclude another person from proving any 
legal or equitable defense or defect, including those set forth in subsection (b), which might have 
been asserted if such mark had not been registered.”). 
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c)(1) (2019); 15 U.S.C. § 1115; Trademark Basics, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/trademark-basicshttps://www.uspto.gov/trade-
marks-getting-started/trademark-basics [https://perma.cc/ZC4B-RSZZ]; Hyman et al., supra note 
12, at 659. 
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
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in good faith.36  In such a case, the senior user would not be able to claim 
priority in that remote region, and it would be difficult for the senior user to 
claim the other user infringed on their mark.37 
A. Finding Trademark Validity and Infringement before Converse, 
Inc. v. International Trade Commission 
In the United States, “use in commerce” helps establish trademark 
rights.38  Under common law, use of the mark in the marketplace helps es-
tablish protection for unregistered marks, but the mark “may be limited only 
to those geographic areas where [it] is used.”39  In addition to use in com-
merce, the distinctiveness of the mark can also help determine the mark’s 
protectability.40  In certain cases, such as with smaller brands, a company 
may consider only establishing common law rights instead of federal regis-
tration.  This may be because they do not have the economic resources to go 
through the application process and then continue to maintain their registra-
tion after filing.   
To find trademark infringement on another user’s mark, there must be 
a valid, protectable mark and likelihood of confusion.41  In addition, with 
respect to trade dress infringement, the mark must also be nonfunctional.42  
Under the Lanham Act:  
Any person who shall . . . use in commerce any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark in 
connection with the sale . . ., distribution or advertising of any 
 
36. Katherine Hunziker, The Good Faith, the Bad Faith and the Ugly, 100 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 671, 678 (2019) (citing United Drug Co. v. Theordore Rectanus Co., 248 
U.S. 90 (1918)). 
37.  Id. 
38. Hyman et al., supra note 12, at 659.  
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 662. 
41. 15 U.S.C. §1114 (2019). 
42. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURES § 1202.02(a)(v) (Oct. 2018); Sabrina Rodrigues, Say “Yes” To The [Trade] Dress: 
A Comment On Trade Dress Protection For The “Look And Feel” Of Lifestyle Blogs, 53 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1005, 1020 (2018). 
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goods or services on or in connection with such use is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be 
liable in civil action . . . .43  
In plain terms, key requirements for an infringement claim include: 1) the 
complainant has a valid and protectable mark, as previously described; 2) the 
complainant owns the mark; and 3) the use must be likely to cause confusion, 
mistake or to deceive as to source, sponsorship or affiliation.44  The issues in 
this comment specifically focus on distinctiveness and priority use. 
1. Distinctiveness and Secondary Meaning 
Unlike word marks and product-packaging trade dress, product-design 
trade dress are not inherently distinctive.45  Instead, for a mark to be capable 
of being a protectable trade dress, the user must show that the mark acquired 
secondary meaning.46  Secondary meaning occurs when, “in the minds of the 
public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the 
product rather than the product itself.”47  For example, in Qualitex Co. v. 
Jacobson Prod. Co., customers identified Qualitex as the source of green-
gold colored press pads, and the Supreme Court held the green-gold color as 
a symbol that had secondary meaning.48  
Over the years, courts have developed varying multi-factor tests, which 
will be discussed in greater depth in Part IV.49  Whether a claimed mark has 
 
43. 15 U.S.C. §1114. 
44. Id.  
45. Igloo Products Corp. v. Brantex, Inc., 202 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 2000). 
46. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210–11, 216 (2000). 
47. Id. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 
(1982)). 
48. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
49. Igloo Products Corp.,  202 F.3d at 817–18; see Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 
20 (1st Cir. 2004); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 226 (2d Cir. 2012); Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2017); Scott 
Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978); Grayson O Co. v. 
Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017); Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Robin Singh 
Educ. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 437, 445 (5th Cir. 2015); Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, 
Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 1999); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 418 
(6th Cir. 2006); Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); Platinum Home Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 
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obtained a secondary meaning is a question of fact to be determined by a 
jury.50  
2. Priority of Use in Common Law Versus Validity of a Registered 
Mark 
Under common law, the general principle is a first in time principle—
this looks at who first used the mark in order to determine which user had 
priority use.51  Use of a mark must rise to the level of use in commerce in 
order for the owner to assert a protectable interest in the trademark.52  “Use 
in commerce” would be the using of a mark in the “ordinary course of trade, 
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”53  The Lanham Act deems 
a mark to be in use in commerce on goods when:  
[I]t is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the 
displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed 
thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement im-
practicable, then on documents associated with the goods on their 
sale, and . . . the goods are sold or transported in commerce . . . .54 
 
722, 728, 732 (7th Cir. 1998); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 991 (9th Cir. 
2006); Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Mo., Inc., 835 F.3d 1238, 1253 (10th Cir. 2016); FN Herstal 
SA v. Clyde Armory, Inc., 838 F.3d 1071, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 2016). 
50. Igloo Products Corp., 202 F.3d at 818.  
51. Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 575, 579–80 (D. Mass. 1986). 
52. 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2019) (defining commerce and stating “the intent of this chapter is to 
regulate commerce within the control of Congress . . . .”); Danielle Crinnion, Get Your Own Street 
Cred: An Argument for Trademark Protection for Street Art, 58 B.C. L. REV. 257, 267 (2019) 
(stating that under the Lanham Act, “use is established through the sale or transportation of goods 
or services,” and “commerce” refers to activities regulated under the Commerce Clause).  But see 
Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting uses such as internal 
transactions—for example, focus groups or beta versions—to test out sales do not constitute use in 
commerce). 
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2019); Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 
1198 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that what constitutes “ordinary course of trade” varies from each 
industry—the frequency and extent of trade sufficient to establish use is based on a particular in-
dustry’s customary practices). 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.  
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If a mark is adopted by a user in a region, without knowledge of the 
registered user’s prior use, and this junior user shows that he or she continu-
ously used the mark since a date prior to the issuance of the senior user’s 
registration, then the junior user can continue to use the mark.55 
This differs from the concept of priority for a registered mark.  A fed-
eral trademark registration gives a legal presumption of ownership on the 
mark.56  Additionally, a registered trademark gives nationwide priority and 
rights, a set priority date, incontestability, notice to potential infringers, and 
from that, evidentiary advantages and protection against counterfeiting, as 
well as import blocking.57  Although an owner registering their mark submits 
a set date, priority use of the owner or another owner in dispute could come 
before or after that.58  If priority use was before the set date, it would consist 
of having used the mark before registration.  If priority use was after the set 
date, it would consist of the registering owner not using the mark despite 
having registered it for a long period of time.59 
B. Protection for Consumers Versus Trademark-Holders within 
Trademark Law 
The purpose of enacting the Lanham Act, as considered and agreed to 
by Congress, was to create “remedies for brand owners suffering from trade-
mark infringement” and to help “consumers by reducing confusingly similar 
products in the marketplace.”60  Another goal that can be interpreted from 
the report is to provide recourse for bad faith actions while leaving room for 
marketplace competition.61   
 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (2012); Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 
F.2d 1177, 1182–83 (1st Cir. 1987). 
56. PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 32, at 11. 
57. Id. at 11, 14. 
58. William Jay Gross, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1075, 1077 n.14 (1990). 
59. See id.; see also PROTECTING YOUR TRADEMARK, supra note 32, at 14; see also M.Z. 
Berger & Co. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  
60. S. Res. 542, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted). 
61. See id. 
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Scholars have long deliberated over who should get the benefits from 
a protected mark—the consumer or the trademark holder.62  Standards to de-
termine trademark infringement have typically tipped the scale in favor of 
one or the other.63  Protecting consumers from confusion can include assur-
ing consistent, quality products and reducing consumer search costs.64  A 
consumer protection focus emphasizes that trademark laws and the law of 
unfair competition are concerned with not only the protection of property 
rights existing in an individual, but also the protection of the public from 
fraud and deceit.65   
On the opposing end, a trademark holder notes that Congress’s purpose 
in enacting the Lanham Act section 43(a) was to create a limited unfair com-
petition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers, and 
almost certainly without any consideration of consumer rights of action in 
particular.66  As defined in section 45, the Lanham Act’s purpose is to exclu-
sively protect the interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous 
commercial conduct.67  Having a standard focused on the trademark holders 
would incentivize them to go into business, protect their profit, protect them 
from free-riders, and protect their goodwill.68 
  
 
62. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–49 (2007) (discussing the development of various theories). 
63. See supra Part V. 
64. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising 
Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 466–67 (2005). 
65. McKenna, supra note 62, at 1847–48, 1858–63. 
66. Id. at 1869. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2019) (“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the 
control of Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such com-
merce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial 
legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent 
fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colora-
ble imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and 
conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the 
United States and foreign nations.”). 
68. See generally McKenna, supra note 62, at 1845 n.13, 1846 n.14, 1855, 1859–60.  
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C. Theory Behind Consumer Protection and Trademark Holder 
Protection 
The Trademark Act of 1946 was enacted to provide federal courts with 
a statutory framework to address disputes on trademark infringement and 
unfair competition.69  The Trademark Act was later amended in 1988 to up-
date it to present-day business practices.70 
When the Trademark Act of 1946 was enacted, Congress continued to 
use the scope and limitations of the common law prior to 1946 and did not 
take on trademark protections as it has expanded to today.71  Before and after 
1946, courts “expanded the subject matter and scope of trademark protection 
by systematically overturning Congress’s . . . judgment on the proper scope 
and limits of trademark protection.”72  As a result, the circuit courts’ “judicial 
expansion in trademark protection hurts consumers and reduces social wel-
fare.”73  Social welfare consists of the welfare of producers and consumers 
in the marketplace; when producers and consumers have a maximized ag-
gregate surplus of welfare, then social welfare is maximized.74  The level of 
competition in a market shifts the surplus between consumers and produc-
ers.75  A higher level of competition maximizes consumer surplus, which 
maximizes social welfare.76  On the other hand, monopolies reduce consumer 
 
69. See, e.g., Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 
1956); Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 1951). 
70. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 1883, 102 Stat. 3935 
(1988); see also Hearing on S. 1883 Before the S. Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-
marks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 1–2 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hon. Dennis 
DeConcini, Chairman of the S. Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
71. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark’s Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get Trademark 
Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1195, 1207 (2018). 
72. Id. at 1207–08. 
73. Id. at 1222. 
74. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 11, 67 (1998); 
Lunney, supra note 71, at 1222–23. 
75. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 74, at 65–76; Lunney, supra note 71, at 1222–23. 
76. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 74, at 65–76; Lunney, supra note 71, at 1222–23. 
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surplus and thus reduce social welfare.77  A trademark decision can affect 
competition in the marketplace, and in turn, court decisions will affect social 
welfare.78  Courts striving to maximize social welfare should, therefore, not 
expand trademark protection and instead loosen the standard for infringe-
ment.  This would increase competition and thus increase the protection of 
consumers.79   
III. THE CONVERSE CONTROVERSY 
On September 10, 2013, Converse was issued a registered trademark 
for the trade dress of the three design elements that were configured on Con-
verse’s All Star shoes.80  “The mark consists of the design of the two stripes 
on the midsole of the shoe, the design of the toe cap, the design of the multi-
layered toe bumper featuring diamonds and line patterns, and the relative 
 
77. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 74, at 65–76; Lunney, supra note 71, at 1222–23. 
78. See Lunney, supra note 71, at 1222–23. 
79.  See, e.g., id. at 1222–23 (explaining that “[i]n the marketplace, social welfare is the 
aggregate welfare of the market participants. Thus, social welfare is maximized when the sum of 
producer and consumer welfare in that marketplace is maximized. If we use producer and consumer 
‘surplus’-defined as the economic benefit captured in excess of marginal cost—as a measure of that 
welfare, then social welfare is maximized when the total surplus to the producers and consumers 
in a given market is maximized. In a perfectly competitive market, competition drives prices down 
to the marginal cost of production. In such a competitive market, producers that are more efficient 
than the marginal producer earn some surplus, but consumers capture the vast majority of the avail-
able surplus. By restricting competition, policy makers can increase prices in the market and 
thereby shift some of the surplus from consumers to producers. But shifting surplus from consumers 
to producers does not merely redistribute wealth. To shift surplus from consumers to producers 
requires raising prices, and raising prices inevitably imposes some degree of deadweight loss, as 
some consumers will be unable to afford the higher prices. As a result, to increase producer surplus 
by any given amount, we must transfer at least that much surplus from consumers and reduce con-
sumer surplus yet further as a result of the deadweight losses higher prices impose. Moreover, when 
the prospect of producer surplus appears, producers may spend real resources competing to capture 
it. Such rent-seeking expenditures can convert what would have been surplus into cost. For that 
reason, maximizing total surplus in a market requires maximizing consumer surplus in the mar-
ket.”). 
80. CONVERSE TRADE DRESS, Registration No. 4,398,753; see also Certain Footwear Prod-
ucts, Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Rem-
edy and Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 10–11 (Nov. 17, 2015). 
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position of these elements to each other.”81  Figure 1 depicts the registered 
mark.82 
Figure 1. Converse’s Registered Mark. 
 
Converse filed a complaint to the ITC83 on October 14, 2014, alleging 
that various footwear products violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 
(“Section 337”).84  Converse claimed a Section 337 violation by “the impor-
tation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the 
United States after importation of shoes that infringe its trademark.”85  It 
further alleged violations based on “unfair competition . . ., common law 
trademark infringement and unfair competition, and trademark dilution, the 
threat or effect of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry in 
 
81. CONVERSE TRADE DRESS, supra note 80. 
82. Id. 
83. A federal agency that has authority under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to issue 
“exclusion orders,” which prevent the importation of products that are infringing United States IP 
rights, and can also be used to prevent importation of products that are found to result in unfair 
competition such as misappropriation of trade secrets, common law trademark infringement, trade 
dress infringement, or other business torts.  19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
84. Id. 
85. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1114 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018).  
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the United States.”86  Figures 2–5 depict the active respondents’ contested 
footwear products at issue.87  
 
Figure 2. Skechers U.S.A., Inc.’s Allegedly Infringing Footwear Products. 
 
 
  
 
86. Certain Footwear Products, Notice of a Commission Decision to Remand, USITC Inv. 
No. 338-TA-936, 1 (Apr. 9, 2019). 
87. Certain Footwear Products, Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Rec-
ommended Determination on Remedy and Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 5–8 (Nov. 17, 
2015). 
Shoe Model Name Image of Shoe  Shoe Model Name Image of Shoe 
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Twinkle Toes 
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Twinkle Toes 
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Shoe Model Name Image of Shoe  Shoe Model Name Image of Shoe 
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Garanimals Tod-
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Figure 3. Walmart Stores, Inc.’s Allegedly Infringing Footwear Products. 
 
Figure 4. Highline United LLC’s Allegedly Infringing Footwear Products. 
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TAM_MACROS_V7.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/20  1:19 PM 
220 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
Shoe Model Name Image of Shoe  Shoe Model Name Image of Shoe 
 
Center Hi 
 
  
Bob Cousy Lo 
 
 
Center Lo 
 
  
Sum Fun Hi 
 
 
Bob Cousy Hi 
 
   
Figure 5. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.’s Allegedly Infringing Foot-
wear Products. 
 
Converse claimed validity of the mark through its registration.88  The 
company also claimed trade dress protection through common law rights be-
fore registration because of its use of the design since 1932.89  Converse as-
serted its early use of the design allowed the mark to acquired secondary 
meaning.90  Respondents disputed this, claiming Converse’s use was not sub-
stantially exclusive, as shown by a survey that concluded “consumers did not 
associate the Converse mark with a single source.”91 
 
88. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1118. 
89. Id. at 1114; Trademark/Trade Dress Infringement, 31 BUS. TORTS REP. 66, 67 (2019). 
90. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1114.  
91. Id. 
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A. The ITC’s Determination 
On November 17, 2014, the ITC began its investigation.92  The ITC 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a final initial determination on No-
vember 17, 2015.93  During the investigation, several “respondents settled, 
were found in default, or were terminated from the investigation.”94  By the 
time of the issuance of the initial determination, twenty-three respondents 
settled with Converse or moved to terminate, leaving only nine of the total 
thirty-two respondents in the case (five of which had defaulted).95  Active 
respondents, or those who had intervened before the ALJ’s final initial de-
termination included Skechers U.S.A., Inc., Walmart Stores, Inc., HU Liq-
uidation, LLC, f.k.a. Highline United LLC, and New Balance Athletics, Inc, 
f.k.a. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.96  
The ITC and the ALJ treated the claim as two separate marks at issue: 
a common law mark and a registered mark.97  The ALJ found a violation of 
Section 337 as to the registered trademark, but not as to the asserted common 
law trademark because the ALJ determined that secondary meaning was not 
acquired.98  In the assessment of secondary meaning, the ITC considered di-
rect and circumstantial evidence including:  
(1) the degree and manner of use; (2) the exclusivity of use; (3) 
the length of use; (4) the degree and manner of sales, advertising 
and promotional activities; (5) the effectiveness of the effort to 
create secondary meaning; (6) the evidence of deliberate copying; 
 
92. Certain Footwear Products, Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Rec-
ommended Determination on Remedy and Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 1 (Nov. 17, 2015). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id.; Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1130. 
96. Certain Footwear Products, Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Rec-
ommended Determination on Remedy and Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 5–8 (Nov. 17, 
2015). 
97. Certain Footwear Prod. Notice; Issuance of Gen. Exclusion Order; Termination of the 
Investigation, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936 (June 23, 2016). 
98. Certain Footwear Products, Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Rec-
ommended Determination on Remedy and Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 130–32 (Nov. 17, 
2015). 
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and (7) the evidence that actual purchasers associate the trade 
dress with a particular source.99   
The ALJ weighed the factors and “found that four of them weighed in favor 
of secondary meaning, one factor weighed against, and two were neutral.”100  
The one that weighed against finding secondary meaning was “the evidence 
that actual purchasers associate the trade dress with a particular source,” 
which uses survey evidence that the ITC considers to be the “strongest and 
most relevant” evidence.101  By relying on the presumption of secondary 
meaning afforded to a registered mark, the ALJ found the registered mark 
was not invalid.102  On the other hand, the ALJ found that the common law 
mark had not established secondary meaning because Converse could not 
overcome the factor for providing “evidence that actual purchasers associate 
the trade dress with a particular source,” but acknowledged that the mark 
could have been infringed if it acquired secondary meaning or was a valid 
and protectable trademark.103 
On June 23, 2016, the ITC reversed the ALJ’s finding that the regis-
tered mark was valid.104  The ITC found that the registered mark was invalid 
 
99. Id. at 15. 
100. Id. at 16, 56 (stating that the “Commission relies upon eight factors in determining the 
credibility and reliability of surveys” as evidence of actual purchasers associating the trade dress 
with a particular source: “(1) Examination of the proper universe; (2) a representative sample drawn 
from the proper universe; (3) a correct mode of questioning interviewees; (4) recognized experts 
conducting the survey; (5) accurate reporting of data gathered; (6) sample design, questionnaire, 
and interviewing in accordance with generally accepted standards of objective procedures and sta-
tistics in the field of surveys; (7) sample design and interviews conducted independently of the 
attorneys; and (8) the interviewers, trained in this field, have no knowledge of the litigation or the 
purpose for which the survey is to be used.”). 
101. Id. at 16–36, 56–57 (stating that the ITC used only Butler’s survey because it found 
issues with the other studies submitted; the survey provided that twenty-one-point-five percent of 
consumers associated the design with the brand, which the ALJ determined is insufficient to estab-
lish secondary meaning). 
102. Id. at 56–57; Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 
1110, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
103. Certain Footwear Prod., Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and Rec-
ommended Determination on Remedy and Bond, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 36, 56–57 (Nov. 
17, 2015). 
104. Certain Footwear Prod. Notice; Issuance of Gen. Exclusion Order; Termination of the 
Investigation, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 42379 (June 23, 2016); Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 
1114–15.  
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because it failed to acquire secondary meaning when the factors in the bal-
ancing test weighed against finding secondary meaning.105  However, the 
ITC affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the common law mark had not acquired 
secondary meaning; it noted that if either trademark had been found to be 
valid or protectable, then the mark would have been infringed.106  
B. Vacated and Remanded by the Federal Circuit 
Converse timely appealed after the ITC’s June 2016 determination, 
urging the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to reverse 
the ITC’s determination.107  Converse argued that if the Federal Circuit did 
not reverse, that determination would “destroy an iconic American brand and 
reward copiers.”108  On October 30, 2018, the Federal Circuit court found 
that the ITC erred in its legal standard for review in the following ways.109  
First, the Federal Circuit found that the ITC should have distinguished 
between those who allegedly infringed on Converse’s mark before Con-
verse’s registration and those who allegedly began infringing after the regis-
tration.110  The Federal Circuit also determined that the ITC erred by refer-
ring to a registered mark and a common law mark separately.111  Instead, the 
Federal Circuit determined the existence of only one single mark, which 
 
105. Certain Footwear Prod. Notice; Issuance of Gen. Exclusion Order; Termination of the 
Investigation, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 42379 (June 23, 2016); Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 
1114–15.  
106. Certain Footwear Prod. Notice; Issuance of Gen. Exclusion Order; Termination of the 
Investigation, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-936, 42379 (June 23, 2016); Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 
1114–15.  
107. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d. at 1115. 
108. Corrected Brief for Appellant at 17, Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 16-
2497 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2017), Doc. No. 78.  
109. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d. at 1119. 
110. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d. at 1115; see, e.g., In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 
F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The federal registration of a trademark does not create an ex-
clusive property right in the mark. The owner of the mark already has the property right established 
by prior use.” “However, those trademark owners who register their marks with the [Patent and 
Trademark Office] PTO are afforded additional protection not provided by the common law.”). 
111. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1115. 
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would receive “different rights from the common law and from federal reg-
istration.”112  The ITC did not determine a “relevant date for assessing the 
existence of secondary meaning,” which, according to the Federal Circuit, 
was necessary since Converse had to establish that its mark acquired second-
ary meaning before the first infringing use by each alleged infringer.113  The 
Federal Circuit explained that although registered marks were presumed to 
be valid,114 this presumption did not apply to alleged acts of infringement 
that took place prior to registration.115  Further, the USPTO did not factually 
determine that secondary meaning existed for the mark at an earlier point in 
time.116  The Federal Circuit pointed out that in the current case, the multi-
year gap between infringement and registration meant that registration could 
not even be probative of secondary meaning at the time of infringement.117 
Second, the Federal Circuit provided its own multi-factor test for as-
sessing secondary meaning despite not having done so in the past.118  In con-
struing its test, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the differing approach by 
the circuit courts.119  The ITC had treated “length, degree, and exclusivity of 
use as separate factors,” but the Federal Circuit felt that these factors should 
be evaluated together because of the substantial interrelation.120  The Federal 
Circuit determined the six factors, to be weighed together, as:  
 
112. Id.; see, e.g., In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d at 1366 (“The federal 
registration of a trademark does not create an exclusive property right in the mark. The owner of 
the mark already has the property right established by prior use.” “However, those trademark own-
ers who register their marks with the [Patent and Trademark Office] PTO are afforded additional 
protection not provided by the common law.”). 
113. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1116. 
114. Id. at 1117–18; 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2019). 
115. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1117. 
116. Trademark/Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 89, at 68. 
117. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1118. 
118. Id. at 1119–20 (while the Federal Circuit has discussed certain factors for analysis in 
the past, it has not actually presented out a set list of factors until the Converse case). 
119. Id. at 1119. 
120. Id. at 1120. 
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(1) association of the trade dress with a particular source by actual 
purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys); (2) length, 
degree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of 
advertising; (4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) 
intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage of the 
product embodying the mark.121   
Under the second factor, with respect to the trademark owner’s and 
third parties’ prior uses of the mark, the court found that the ITC relied too 
strongly on long-ago prior uses and the registration date.122  The court stated 
that “[b]ecause secondary meaning related to what was in the minds of con-
sumers at the relevant point in time, the analysis of this factor needed to take 
the timing into consideration.”123  The evidence of use in the recent period 
(i.e., the last five years) before the first use date or date of infringement was 
the most relevant part of the timing consideration.124  With respect to the 
ITC’s evaluation of survey evidence, the court noted that there was minimal 
relevance between ITC’s primary reliance on the Butler survey125 and find-
ing  secondary meaning for the intervening respondents.126  The reason for 
this was that the survey was conducted two years after the date of registra-
tion, whereas the ITC considered the existence of secondary meaning as of 
each first infringing use by each intervenor, the latest of which was probably 
more than five years before the survey.127 
Finally, the Federal Circuit continued to evaluate the ITC’s assessment 
on trademark infringement and provided its own analysis.128  The appeals 
court agreed with the intervening active respondents that the ITC erred in 
finding a likelihood of confusion with respect to accused products that lacked 
 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 1121. 
125. Id. at 1123 (“The intervenors’ expert, Sarah Butler, surveyed respondents in the spring 
of 2015 to determine whether they associated the ‘753 trademark with a single source.”). 
126. Id. at 1122–23. 
127. Id. 
128. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1123–24. 
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one or more elements of Converse’s registered trademark.129  The appeals 
court held that accused products that are not “substantially similar” cannot 
infringe on a trademark.130  It further noted, “We have applied an analogous 
requirement in the design-patent context, where infringement cannot be 
found unless an ordinary observer would perceive that the ‘two designs are 
substantially the same.’”131  On remand, the appeals court stated that the ITC 
must now analyze whether the accused product is “substantially similar” to 
the protected trade dress instead of just “similar.”132 
C. Dissenting Opinion within the Federal Circuit’s Ruling 
Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit disagreed with certain reason-
ings for the majority’s decision to remand; this included “the validity of the 
registered mark for further consideration and its decision to address ques-
tions of infringement.”133  She provided four concerns she had about the ma-
jority’s opinion:  
[T]he majority (1) misperceived the scope of the ITC’s authority 
to invalidate duly issued intellectual property rights when it 
addressed the issues of the validity of a registered mark;134 (2) 
blurred the line between the concepts of priority of use under 
common law and the validity of a registered mark; (3) gave 
unnecessary opinions on the weight of certain survey evidence 
 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 1124; see Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.), 50 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“[S]ubstantial similarity of appearance is necessarily a prerequisite to a finding of likelihood of 
confusion in product configuration cases.”). 
131. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 
F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  
132. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1124. 
133. Id. at 1127 (O’Malley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
134. Id. at 1127, 1129 (O’Malley found that because the remaining intervening respond-
ents’ first uses began before registration, the question of validity of the registered mark was irrele-
vant to the question of who has priority of use of a common law trade dress). 
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and the question of infringement; and (4) ignored the ITC’s 
statutory obligation to enter remedies against defaulting parties.135   
This comment agrees with O’Malley’s second and third concerns, and 
further discusses and expands on these issues in Part V.  
IV. UNCERTAINTY FOR SECONDARY MEANING 
Circuit courts throughout the United States have developed varying 
factors to test whether secondary meaning exists in a trademark, each placing 
different weight on certain factors.136  Depending on where a case is heard, 
different outcomes may result for finding infringement of a trademark de-
spite a similar set of facts.137  There are certain factors that overlap between 
the circuit courts.  This Comment focuses on the different approaches by 
circuit courts and highlight the distinctions, as well as show how the Federal 
Circuit’s factors are distinguished from them.138  The Appendix at the end of 
this Comment summarizes the factors. 
A. Short and Succinct 
In Flynn v. AK Peters, the First Circuit determined that a plaintiff can 
meet the burden of showing a product has acquired secondary meaning 
through either direct evidence, such as consumer surveys or testimony, or 
through circumstantial evidence.139  This can be presented through: “(1) the 
length and manner of its use, (2) the nature and extent of advertising and 
 
135. Converse, Inc., 909 F.3d at 1127–28. 
136. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringe-
ment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582–83 (2006). 
137. See id. at 1597 (comparing the proportion of the Second Circuit plaintiff win rate to 
the Ninth Circuit win rate: the Second Circuit has a much lower win rate at 37% compared to all 
other circuits at 51%, whereas the Ninth Circuit has a much higher win rate at 64% compared to all 
other circuits at 43%). 
138. Even the Restatement of the Law has its own set of factors to find a likelihood of 
confusion: (a) “a consideration of all the circumstances involved in the marketing of the respective 
goods or services or in the operation of the respective businesses”; (b) the intent of the actor; and 
(c) evidence of actual confusion.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21-23 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1995). 
139. Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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promotion of the mark[,] and (3) the efforts made in the direction of promot-
ing a conscious connection, in the public’s mind, between the name or mark 
and a particular product or venture.”140  The third factor141 is not a factor 
included by the Federal Circuit in its clarification. 
To acquire a secondary meaning in the minds of the buying 
public, a labelled product, when shown to a prospective customer, 
must prompt the reaction, ‘That is the product I want because I 
know that all products with that label come from a single source 
and have the same level of quality.’  In other words, the article 
must proclaim its identity of source and quality, and not serve 
simply to stimulate further enquiry about it.142 
In Flynn, a textbook author sued her publisher for accepting book revi-
sions from her co-author without her consent and then giving a third party 
co-authorship credit.143  Plaintiff did not offer any direct evidence, so the 
court focused on circumstantial evidence.144  The court held that the circum-
stantial evidence was lacking because the claim Plaintiff brought ignored the 
“stringent requirements for secondary meaning.”145  Plaintiff only provided 
testimony that she had an “esteemed reputation and a well-recognized 
name.”146  The court did not find that the author’s publisher infringed on the 
purported use of the author’s name as a trademark.147 
 
140. Id. (citation omitted); see also Tonawanda St. Corp. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 842 F.2d 643, 
648 (2d Cir. 1988) (identifying other factors that may be considered to prove secondary meaning, 
such as “advertising expenditures, consumer surveys, media coverage, attempts to copy the mark, 
and length and exclusivity of use.”). 
141. Flynn, 377 F.3d at 20 (citation omitted) (stating the third factor of the First Circuit 
secondary meaning test as: efforts made to promote a conscious connection). 
142. Id. at 20 (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15:11 (4th ed. 2017)). 
143. Id. at 15–17. 
144. Id. at 20.  
145. Id. at 20–21.  
146. Id. (citation omitted). 
147. Id. at 20–22. 
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B. Small but Important Differences in Detail 
The Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits generally focus on the same 
following factors used in Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent (“Chris-
tian Louboutin”): (1) advertising expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking 
the mark to a source; (3) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (4) sales 
success; (5) attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6) length and exclusivity 
of the mark’s use.148  In Christian Louboutin, Christian Louboutin asserted 
that its red-soled shoes trade dress was infringed by the Yves Saint Laurent 
all red shoe.149  The Second Circuit held that the color red for the sole of a 
Christian Louboutin shoe can and did qualify for trade dress protection be-
cause Louboutin established secondary meaning in its red soles.150  The court 
found that there was extensive evidence of Louboutin’s “advertising expend-
itures, media coverage, and sales success,” and that Louboutin had clearly 
commercialized the use of the lacquered red color for over twenty years.151  
The Federal Circuit in Converse supported the above factors,152 alt-
hough the following are distinguishing language that should be noted. The 
Federal Circuit’s “intentional copying” factor153 differs from the Seventh, 
Fourth, and Tenth Circuits’ factor of “attempts to plagiarize the mark.”154  
The Federal Circuit also uses “amount of sales and number of customers”155 
instead of “sales success” as a factor.  Nevertheless, none of the circuits pro-
vide guidance as to when sales success (from a particular number of sales or 
a particular number of customers) would be satisfied. 
 
148. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 
226 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Centaur Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 
1222 (2d Cir. 1987)); Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017); Forney 
Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Mo., Inc., 835 F.3d 1238, 1253 (10th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016). 
149. Christian Louboutin S.A., 696 F.3d at 212–13. 
150. Id. at 225. 
151. Id. at 226. 
152. See supra Part III, Section B. 
153. Id. 
154. Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2004). 
155. Id. 
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Additionally, in place of the Second and Fourth Circuits’ third factor, 
“unsolicited media coverage of the product,”156 the Tenth Circuit looks at 
“efforts made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the 
public’s mind, between the trade dress and a particular product or ven-
ture.”157  In Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Missouri, Inc., Forney manufac-
tured and sold a variety of product lines, one of which used certain packaging 
colors and flame motifs that Forney alleged Daco infringed upon.158  The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed that Forney’s trade dress did not acquire secondary 
meaning because Forney’s advertising “utterly fail[ed] to mention the Color 
Mark, or to emphasize it in any fashion[,]” and its sales volume gave no 
indication of how those sales related to the color mark.159 
The Federal Circuit uses “unsolicited media coverage of the product 
embodying the mark” as a factor160 instead of the Tenth Circuit’s which looks 
at “efforts made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the 
public’s mind, between the trade dress and a particular product or ven-
ture.”161  The former is narrower than the latter.  The Federal Circuit’s factor 
requires the user to show precise media coverage, and that the media cover-
age must embody the mark.  On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit’s factor 
only needs to show that the user made efforts to connect the mark with the 
user’s product, which can be easier to prove. 
C. Distinguishing Consumer Surveys and Testimonies 
In Test Masters Education Services v. Robin Singh Education Services, 
the Fifth Circuit used similar factors to the Second and Fourth Circuit,162 but 
 
156. Christian Louboutin S.A., 696 F.3d at 226; Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 
F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017). 
157. Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Mo., Inc., 835 F.3d 1238, 1253 (10th Cir. 2016) (quot-
ing Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d 1133, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016). 
158. Id.  at 1241–43. 
159. Id. at 1254–55 (citation omitted). 
160. See supra Part III, Section B. 
161. Forney Indus., Inc., 835 F.3d at 1253. 
162. See supra Part IV, Section B. 
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instead analyzed consumer-survey evidence and direct consumer testimony 
as two separate, specific factors.163  The factors the Fifth Circuit uses are:  
(1) length and manner of use of the mark or trade dress, (2) 
volume of sales, (3) amount and manner of advertising, (4) nature 
of use of the mark or trade dress in newspapers and magazines, 
(5) consumer-survey evidence, (6) direct consumer testimony, 
and (7) the defendant’s intent in copying the [mark].164 
In Test Masters Education Services, both parties were in the test prep-
aration business, and the issue surrounded both parties’ use of courses named 
“TESTMASTERS.”165  One party was “Test Masters,” while the other was 
“Testmasters,” both contesting the use of “TESTMASTERS” as a mark, 
among similar names “Testmasters,” “TestMasters,” and “Test Masters.”166  
To satisfy the consumer-survey evidence factor, Test Masters submitted sur-
vey evidence of 300 people who recently took or planned to take engineering 
exams, and as little as 50% of the individuals surveyed associated “Testmas-
ters” with one company.167  The Fifth Circuit found issue with the survey not 
identifying which company the respondents associated the name with and 
with half the survey being polled in Texas where Test Masters had exclusiv-
ity.168  To satisfy the direct consumer testimony factor, Test Masters submit-
ted evidence of thousands of customer satisfaction correspondence, individ-
uals’ statements that they only identify the mark with Test Masters, customer 
evaluation forms, and former students’ receipts of referral fees.169  Singh, the 
defendant, also submitted evidence showing people believing they were reg-
istering for Singh’s course when registering for Test Masters’ course.170  The 
 
163. Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Robin Singh Educ. Servs., Inc., 799 F.3d 437, 445 
(5th Cir. 2015).  
164. Id.  
165. Id. at 442. 
166. Id. n.1. 
167. Id. at 446. 
168. Id. at 446–47.  
169. Id. at 447. 
170. Id. 
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Fifth Circuit affirmed that this factor was unpersuasive for Test Masters as 
the evidence suggests some consumer confusion.171 
The Federal Circuit does not distinguish between consumer-survey ev-
idence and direct consumer testimony in the same way the Fifth Circuit does.  
The Federal Circuit only provides consumer surveys as an example of a 
measurement for the association of the trade dress with a particular source 
by actual purchasers.172 
Additionally, it is important to note that similar to the Second Circuit 
approach in Section B, the Fifth Circuit also places emphasis on “attempts 
to plagiarize,” but their application seems to be opposing this.173  While the 
Second Circuit noted this factor as “largely irrelevant,”174 the Fifth Circuit 
held the factor as “critical.”175 
D. Missing Crucial Factors to Consider 
The Third Circuit has generally looked towards factors from Scott Pa-
per Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc. (“Scott Paper Co.”):  
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s trademark and 
the alleged infringing mark; (2) the strength of the owner’s mark; 
(3) the price of the products or services and other factors 
indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when 
making a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used 
the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the 
intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; (6) the evidence of 
actual confusion; (7) whether the products or services, though not 
competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and 
advertised through the same media; (8) the extent to which the 
targets of the parties’ sales efforts are the same; (9) the 
relationship of the products or services in the minds of consumers 
because of the similarity of function; [and] (10) other facts 
 
171. Id. 
172. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1120 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
173. Smolenski & Welch, supra note 21, at 109. 
174. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986). 
175. Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior 
owner to manufacture a product or provide a service in the 
defendant’s market, or that he is likely to expand into that 
market.176 
In Scott Paper Co., the plaintiff alleged infringement of its “Scott” 
name registered marks on plastic and paper personal and household products 
by defendant’s “Scott’s Liquid Gold” registered mark on household clean-
ers.177  The Federal Circuit did not include the factors indicative of the care 
and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase, such as size 
of the company and actual confusion,178 but both are important considera-
tions. 
The Sixth Circuit applies the eight-factor test, as used in Marketing 
Displays v. TrafFix Devices: (1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) related-
ness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confu-
sion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) 
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of 
the product lines.179  Marketing Displays had utility patents for a “dual-
spring base” mechanism that keeps road signs upright under windy condi-
tions.180  After those patents expired, TrafFix began marketing sign stands 
that copied the mechanism, which Marketing Displays brought a claim 
against.181  The Federal Circuit does not include “likelihood of expansion of 
the product lines” as a factor,182 which (similar to the size of the company) 
can be an important consideration.   
 
176. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978) (al-
terations given to original); see also Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
177. Scott Paper Co., 589 F.2d at 1227.  
178. See supra Part III, Section B. 
179. Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 933 (6th Cir. 1999); 
see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2006). 
180. Marketing Displays, Inc., 200 F.3d at 932. 
181. Id. at 932–33. 
182. See supra Part III, Section B. 
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E. Closest to the Federal Circuit’s Clarified Factors 
The Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are the few Circuit Courts 
to use factors that come closest to what the Federal Circuit has implemented.  
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits look to: (1) whether actual purchasers of 
the product bearing the mark associate the mark with the producer; (2) the 
degree and manner of advertising under the mark; (3) the length and manner 
of use of the mark; and (4) whether use of the mark has been exclusive in 
determining if secondary meaning has been acquired.183  The Seventh Circuit 
considers: (1) the amount and manner of advertising; (2) the sales volume; 
(3) the length and manner of use; (4) consumer testimony; and (5) consumer 
surveys.184  The Plaintiff in Int’l Kennel Club showed that it did not just have 
advertising in Chicago, but throughout the nation—and that they had sales 
from 20,000–30,000 people coming from 36 states.185  Additionally, Plaintiff 
had consumer testimony through letters and calls displaying consumer con-
fusion.186  Here, the Seventh Circuit found for the Plaintiff.187  Although con-
sumer testimony was shown to be helpful in determining secondary meaning 
here, sales volume was not addressed enough with regard to how many peo-
ple associating with the source would be considered a significant number in 
order to acquire secondary meaning.188 
  
 
183. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 991 (9th Cir. 2006); FN Herstal SA 
v. Clyde Armory, Inc., 838 F.3d 1071, 1083–84 (11th Cir. 2016). 
184. See Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th 
Cir. 1988). 
185. Id. at 1080–81. 
186.  Id. at 1082. 
187. Id. at 1086 (noting that the Plaintiff was not required to show evidence of consumer 
surveys as it was in the preliminary judgment stage at that moment). 
188. Id. at 1095 (Cudahy, C.J., dissenting). 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
There has always been debate about whether the more worn-down a 
Converse is, the better it looks.  The same can be said about whether the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Converse turned a better “look” for trademark 
law or not.  Although the Federal Circuit in Converse is correct in ruling that 
the ITC determination was in error and should be vacated, the Federal Circuit 
should have stopped after clarifying where the ITC’s legal standard erred.  
“It does too much by directing the ITC to further address the validity and 
infringement of the registered mark, even though the statute requires that the 
ITC presume that Converse’s infringement allegations against the defaulting 
parties are true and that its registered mark is valid.”189  As the dissent ad-
dresses, the Court’s analysis on Converse’ trademark validity drove priority 
use under common law and the validity of a registered mark into further con-
fusion.190 
A. Incomplete Method for Acquiring Secondary Meaning 
Prior to Converse, the Federal Circuit discussed certain factors relevant 
to analyzing whether secondary meaning had been acquired.191  The Federal 
Circuit in Converse clarified which considerations need to be assessed.192  
The six factors that are weighed together are: “(1) association of the trade 
dress with a particular source by actual purchasers (typically measured by 
customer surveys), (2) length, degree, and exclusivity of use, (3) amount and 
manner of advertising, (4) amount of sales and number of customers, (5) in-
tentional copying, and (6) unsolicited media coverage of the product embod-
ying the mark.”193  The Federal Circuit left on remand for the ITC to apply 
these factors.194  
 
189. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1133 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
190. Id. at 1127–28. 
191. Id. at 1120 (majority opinion). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 1118, 1124. 
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1. Proposal for Alternative Set Standard 
The Federal Circuit’s second, third, and fifth factors are acceptable, but 
additional factors and changes to the rest should be made.  This Comment 
argues for a uniform standard for finding trademark infringement that would 
strengthen consumer protection while encouraging fair competition.  The 
following is a proposed standard that would encompass the balance dis-
cussed above and would combine certain important factors from other circuit 
tests: (1) consumer survey evidence with a soft threshold, (2) direct con-
sumer testimony, (3) length, degree, and exclusivity of use, (4) amount and 
manner of advertising, (5) amount of sales and number of customers as in 
relation to the sixth factor, (6) size of the company or established place in 
the market, (7) attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (8) efforts made to pro-
mote a conscious connection in the public’s mind, between the trade dress 
and a particular product or venture.  Factors (1), (2), (6), (7), and (8) coincide 
with the Converse factors. 
a. Proposed Factors (1) and (2): Consumer Survey Evidence and 
Direct Consumer Testimony 
“Consumer testimony” and “direct consumer survey” should each be 
factors instead of the Federal Circuit’s “association of the trade dress with a 
particular source by actual purchasers.”195  The Fifth Circuit’s factors distin-
guish between consumer-survey evidence and direct consumer testimony.196  
The Federal Circuit, however, provides only consumer surveys as an exam-
ple of a measurement for the association of the trade dress with a particular 
source by actual purchasers.197 
Distinguishing between survey evidence and testimony has its benefits 
and risks.  To include the Federal Circuit’s factor without distinguishing be-
tween consumer-survey evidence and direct consumer testimony could open 
up additional possibilities of evidence of use, such as data tracking on 
Google, or other search engines, searches and subsequent clicks on links, or 
data tracking consumers’ online retail shopping.  The additional possibilities 
could be beneficial because it could provide more evidence of consumer con-
fusion in the modern age.  At the same time, the additional possibilities could 
 
195. See supra Part III, Section B. 
196. See supra Part IV, Section C. 
197. See supra Part III, Section B. 
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have inaccuracies in determining the consumer thought process and associ-
ation since these forms of data tracking are relatively new and might be un-
related to genuine consumer use (e.g., ad bots). 
A narrower approach that distinguishes survey evidence and testimony 
would place less risk on likelihood of confusion and would give consumers 
more protection.  Distinguishing between the two increases consumer pro-
tection because surveys provide statistical evidence that “connect . . . [a] 
mark to the source of the product, rather than the product itself[,]” and “nar-
row the scope of inquiry to the relevant consumer base.”198  In contrast, con-
sumer testimony gives direct evidence of consumer experiences of confu-
sion.  Some may also argue that consumer surveys and direct consumer 
testimony offer sturdier reliance, because parties can directly reach out to 
consumers and ask whether they associate the mark with the product.199  
Additionally, the direct consumer survey factor should have a soft 
threshold of when it is probative of secondary meaning.200  Circuit courts are 
already divided on what percentage of positive responses on surveys is pro-
bative of secondary meaning; this split can result in forum shopping and eco-
nomic inefficiency.201  Trademark holders could be inclined to select juris-
dictions favorable to their case, which makes case outcomes unpredictable 
and could decrease consumer protection in certain jurisdictions. 
For the Federal Circuit factor to show only “an association,”202 on the 
other hand, could potentially give way to trademark holders bringing in less 
reliable evidence.  Furthermore, circuit courts that decide to adopt the Fed-
eral Circuit’s standard could continue perpetuating forum shopping and eco-
nomic inefficiency because showing only “an association” would be an eas-
ier factor for trademark holders to satisfy. 
 
198. Dominic A. Azzopardi, Disarray Among the Circuits: When Are Consumer Surveys 
Persuasive?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 829, 839 (2019). 
199. Id. at 839–40; Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 248 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (“While survey evidence is not required to establish secondary mean-
ing, it is ‘the most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning.’”). 
200. This Comment does not argue for a specific soft threshold, but it does suggest a thresh-
old such as the one offered in Azzopardo, supra note 198, at 848–51 (discussing and offering a 
guidepost on how judges can analyze consumer survey evidence). 
201. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geo-
graphic Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 N.C. L. REV. 889, 932 (2001) (describing how circuit splits 
make case outcomes unpredictable, causing litigants to settle less often). 
202. See supra Part III, Section B. 
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b. Proposed Factor (6): Size of the Company or Established Place in 
the Market 
 The “size of the company” or “established place in the market” should 
be included when considering the proposed fifth factor, which is the amount 
of sales and number of customers.  Both factors would further strengthen 
consumer protection by encouraging fair competition.  This would place the 
balance back between consumer protection and trademark-holder protection. 
Unlike the Third Circuit, the Federal Circuit does not include the size 
of the company and actual confusion as factors.203  Similarly, unlike the Sixth 
Circuit, the Federal Circuit does not include “likelihood of expansion of the 
product lines” as a factor,204 which is an important consideration to deter-
mine where the mark is established in the market.  A factor on the size of the 
company or an established place in the market could help supplement the 
evaluation of the amount of sales and number of customers factor.  As pre-
viously discussed, the circuit courts have not indicated what the tipping point 
would be to have the amount of sales or number of customers satisfied and 
potentially find likelihood of confusion.205  It could help place the facts in 
context for courts to determine the existence of secondary meaning if a court 
specified an amount in proportion to a company’s size or how established a 
brand may be in the market or the possibility for future brand expansion. 
c. Proposed Factor (7): Attempts to Plagiarize the Mark 
The Federal Circuit’s “intentional copying” factor differs from the Sev-
enth, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit factor of “attempts to plagiarize the mark.”206  
The “intent” to copy means to have mind, attention, or will concentrated on 
that purpose of copying, while an “attempt” would be the actual act of trying 
to do something.207  Finding an intent to copy could be easier for a plaintiff 
than finding an attempt to plagiarize because the former requires proving the 
 
203. See supra Part IV, Section D. 
204. See supra Part IV, Section D. 
205. See supra Part IV, Section D. 
206. See supra Part IV, Section B. 
207. Definition of Intent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/intent [https://perma.cc/2NSV-3UG6]; Definition of Attempt, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/attempt [https://perma.cc/T6VC-
XCM7]. 
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defendant’s state of mind, while the latter requires proving an act.  An “at-
tempt to plagiarize” factor would assist consumers because it increases com-
petition by making it more or less easy for trademark holders to find infringe-
ment. 
d. Proposed Factor (8): Efforts Made to Promote a Conscious 
Connection in the Public Mind 
The last proposed factor is “efforts made to promote a conscious con-
nection,” such as unsolicited media coverage of the product that embodies 
the mark.  This factor, provided by the First Circuit,208 is absent from the 
Federal Circuit’s factors.209  As the First Circuit noted, to determine whether 
secondary meaning has attached, the mindset of average consumers of the 
books are considered, specifically a broad class of consumers like those 
“from ‘high school age to Ph.D. level researchers[,]’” and not a select subset 
of academic “insiders.”210  This factor will further increase consumer protec-
tion because it would make the standard more lenient for trademark holders, 
thereby increasing competition. 
The Federal Circuit uses “unsolicited media coverage of the product 
embodying the mark” as a factor211 instead of the Tenth Circuit’s “efforts 
made in the direction of promoting a conscious connection, in the public’s 
mind, between the trade dress and a particular product or venture.”212  The 
former is narrower than the latter.  As the Tenth Circuit noted, “advertising 
alone is typically unhelpful to prove secondary meaning when it is not di-
rected at highlighting the trade dress.”213  The Tenth Circuit’s factor would 
favor consumer protection more because its broadness encompasses the Fed-
eral Circuit’s factor as well.  This broader factor could make it more difficult 
 
208. Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2004). 
209. See supra Part III, Section B. 
210. Flynn, 377 F.3d at 21. 
211. See supra Part III, Section B. 
212. See supra Part IV, Section B. 
213. Forney Indus., Inc. v. Daco of Missouri, Inc., 835 F.3d 1238, 1254 (10th Cir. 2016); 
Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To demonstrate 
secondary meaning based on advertising, the advertising must be of a nature and extent to create 
an association [of the trade dress] with the advertiser’s goods.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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for trademark holders to satisfy the factor and find infringement, and there-
fore increase both market competition and consumer protection. 
2. Setting a Uniform Standard 
To resolve potential future controversy, the Supreme Court should set 
forth a uniform standard such as the one proposed in this Comment.  How-
ever, because precedent shows that this is unlikely,214 the Federal Circuit will 
likely not be granted trademark appellate jurisdiction in the near future.215  
The Supreme Court should not give such a grant to the Federal Circuit, since 
certain factors should be adjusted to prevent the limitations that the Federal 
Circuits’ factors set forth.  Another possible method to resolve the contro-
versy of non-uniformity among the circuits would be for Congress to actually 
amend the Lanham Act to incorporate a uniform test, as proposed above.216  
However, the likelihood of Congress amending the Lanham Act is very low 
given the sparse legislative history and amendments surrounding the Act.217  
Trademark holders and consumers can only hope that perhaps one day there 
will be consistency among the courts on how to find trademark infringement.  
B. Blurring the Line between Priority of Use and Validity of a 
Registered Mark 
“The majority goes on to assess the validity of the registered mark even 
though no respondents remain for whom the registered mark is relevant.”218  
The Federal Circuit found that a registered trade dress “and its accompanying 
presumption of secondary meaning operate only prospectively from the date 
 
214. See J. Thomas McCarthy & Dina Roumiantseva, Commentary, Divert All Trademark 
Appeals to the Federal Circuit? We Think Not, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 1275, 1275 (2015); Paul M. 
Janicke, To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 657–58 (2002). 
215. Smolenski & Welch, supra note 21, at 109. 
216. Id. 
217. 1 CHARLES E. MCKENNEY AND GEORGE F. LONG III, FEDERAL UNFAIR 
COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT 43A § 1:2 (West 2019). 
218. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1131 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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of registration . . . .”219  Prior to that, the mark holder must show they ac-
quired secondary meaning before the first infringing use of each accused in-
fringer.220  This contradicts the Federal Circuit’s precedent in Braun v. Dy-
namic Corp. of Am., where the Federal Circuit stated that “[a] claim of trade 
dress infringement fails if secondary meaning did not exist before the in-
fringement began.”221  The majority’s decision to assess the validity of the 
registered mark in Converse implied that “a later-obtained registration is 
somehow relevant to establishing priority of use at an earlier date.”222 
Courts should keep the distinction between priority use and registration 
as it has in the past and continue to look at when the use was before having 
to show secondary meaning.  “A party with priority of use may continue to 
use a mark without infringing even if the mark later acquires distinctive-
ness—demonstrated through registration or otherwise.”223 
VI. IMPACT ON THE FOOTWEAR, AND POTENTIALLY EVEN THE 
APPAREL, INDUSTRIES 
Footwear is a major product category in the United States economy, 
accounting for nearly 80 billion dollars in sales in 2017.224  Consequently, 
footwear is also a large target for counterfeiters.  According to the 2017 sei-
zure statistics by the United States Customs and Border Protection (“Cus-
toms”), footwear is a top category of counterfeit goods entering the United 
States market, accounting for twelve percent of all seizures.225  Customs 
 
219. Id. at 1117 (majority opinion). 
220. Id. at 1118. 
221. Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
222. Converse Inc., 909 F.3d at 1131 (O’Malley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
223. Id. 
224. See Liam O’Connell, U.S. Footwear Market - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Jan. 15, 
2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/4704/us-footwear-market/ [https://perma.cc/SQ3T-6Y78].   
225. Hyman et al., supra note 12, at 647; see U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
OFFICE OF TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (2017), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default
/files/assets/documents/2018-Jan
/FY2016%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics%20Book%20%28PDF%20Formatting%29_OT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GUP6-WJJ7]. 
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seized nearly $42 million worth of footwear in 2017, and this value is pro-
jected to grow as shoe brands and designs continue to increase in recognition 
and in the resulting counterfeiting.226 
With the addition of the Federal Circuit’s standard to all the different 
multi-factored tests, and with varying weights placed on different factors, 
judicial analysis of trademark infringement becomes “less uniform and less 
predictable.”227  The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions passed on 
the opportunity to set forth a uniform standard for a test in determining sec-
ondary meaning,228 which means that the Federal Circuit has not been 
granted exclusive trademark appellate jurisdiction.229  However, because the 
Federal Circuit was created to prevent forum shopping and to provide uni-
formity in patent law, other circuits including the Ninth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, which are already very similar, could potentially now look towards the 
Federal Circuit’s clarification as a test to follow since it could help in solving 
similar problems in trademark law.  Circuits, such as the First and Third Cir-
cuits, whose tests vary significantly may place more scrutiny on the Federal 
Circuit’s test.  
The widening use of the Federal Circuit’s standard could have a signif-
icant impact on the footwear industry in the foreseeable future.  This would 
consequently leave a heavy effect on the United States economy.  Because 
the Federal Circuit held that the ITC erred in the factors that it applied, the 
ITC will be using those new factors to assess any claims that are brought 
through the ITC in violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.  This 
expansion on trademark protection could give more market power to brands, 
which would lower competition and hurt consumers and social welfare.  This 
might, in the immediate future, benefit footwear industry brands to not have 
their designs infringed upon.  But in the long term, because of the continued 
negative effect on consumers, this could have a subsequent negative effect 
on trademark holders as the market potentially goes down.  Simultaneously, 
it could be argued that the broader protection for trademark holders decreases 
 
226. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF TRADE, supra note 225, at 
23; see supra Part III, Section B(1) for more on Customs recordation. 
227. Beebe, supra note 136, at 1646. 
228. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 820 (1961); Frisch’s Rests.v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 916 (1982); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978). 
229. Smolenski & Welch, supra note 21, at 109.  
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consumer likelihood of confusion, which is the primary protection that trade-
mark law affords consumers, and that this protection is enough to keep the 
marketplace going. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Trademark rights are necessary not only for business owners like foot-
wear brands, but also for consumers who feed into that market.  The evolu-
tion and change of finding secondary meaning for trademark infringement 
has been given different standards throughout the courts, but there is a need 
for a uniform standard that strengthens consumer protection while encour-
aging fair competition among trademark holders.  The standard that courts 
apply will affect how businesses and markets run and would effectively im-
pact the nationwide economy. 
Courts should also keep in mind that the Federal Circuit’s stance on the 
ITC’s infringement analysis is dicta and no more than an advisory opinion.230  
This Comment recommends courts to continue to distinguish between 
priority of use in common law from a registered mark validity.  Additionally, 
courts should not be obligated to follow the balancing test for finding 
secondary meaning set forth by the Federal Circuit.  Instead, courts can look 
to other circuits and consider adding and/or adjusting factors to strengthen 
their own tests.  In consideration of which factors to add or adjust, courts 
should do so in an effort to balance the scale between consumer protection 
and trademark holder protection. 
  
 
230. Converse, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n Skechers U.S.A., Inc., 909 F.3d 1110, 1132 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (O’Malley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Appendix: Summary of Factors to Determine Secondary Meaning 
 
 Consumer Connection 
Use/Strength 
of Mark Advertising 
Federal 
Circuit 
Association of the 
trade dress with a 
particular source by 
actual purchasers 
Length, degree, and 
exclusivity of use 
Amount and manner 
of advertising 
First Circuit 
Efforts made in the 
direction of promot-
ing a conscious con-
nection, in the pub-
lic’s mind, between 
the name or mark 
and a particular 
product or venture 
Length and manner 
of its use - 
Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, 
and Tenth 
Circuits 
Consumer studies 
linking the mark to a 
source 
 
Fifth Circuit only: 
consumer surveys 
and consumer 
testimony 
Length and 
exclusivity of the 
mark’s use 
Advertising 
expenditures 
Third Circuit 
Customer surveys 
and customer 
testimony 
Length of use, 
exclusivity of use, 
and degree of 
similarity/strength 
of owner’s mark 
Extent to target sales 
efforts 
Sixth Circuit 
Evidence of actual 
confusion and likely 
degree of purchaser 
care 
Strength of 
plaintiff’s mark 
Marketing channels 
used 
Seventh 
Circuit 
Consumer testimony 
and consumer 
surveys 
Length and manner 
of use 
Amount and manner 
of advertising 
Ninth and 
Eleventh 
Circuits 
Whether actual 
purchasers of the 
product bearing the 
mark associate the 
mark with the 
producer 
Length and manner 
of use and whether 
use has been 
exclusive in 
determining if 
secondary meaning 
has been acquired 
Degree and manner 
of advertising under 
the mark 
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Sales Copying Media Miscellaneous 
Amount of sales and 
number of 
customers 
Intentional copying 
Unsolicited media 
coverage of the 
product embodying 
the mark 
- 
- - 
Nature and extent of 
advertising and 
promotion of the 
mark 
- 
Sales success 
Attempts to 
plagiarize the mark 
Unsolicited media 
coverage of the 
product 
Tenth Circuit only:  
efforts made in the 
direction of promot-
ing a conscious con-
nection, in the pub-
lic’s mind, between 
the trade dress and a 
particular product or 
venture 
Factors indicative of 
consumer care and 
attention: size of the 
company, number of 
sales, and number of 
customers 
Intent in adopting - 
Use of the mark in 
trade and actual 
confusion 
- 
Intent in selecting 
mark, similarity of 
the marks, 
relatedness of the 
goods 
- 
Likelihood of 
expansion of 
product lines 
Sales volume - - - 
- - - - 
